

Canada's Passage of Transparency Modern Slavery Legislation: How the domestic landscape shaped the law

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Abstract

Countries, primarily in the Global North, have been implementing transparency and corporate sustainability due diligence laws. These laws seek to increase corporate accountability for various human rights, environmental, and modern slavery offences in global supply chains. Three legislative models have been adopted: 1) Disclosure or Transparency laws; 2) Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence (MHRDD) laws; and 3) MHRDD laws with civility liability, which is considered best practice. In this article, I evaluate the factors that influenced the adoption of a particular legislative model in various countries and specifically examine what factors influenced the passage of transparency legislation in Canada. I argue that despite international pressure on Canada to enact legislation, it was ultimately features of Canada's domestic political economy that determined the enactment of a transparency law. These features include Canada's membership of the Anglosphere, its powerful mining industry, the advocacy of civil society organisations, key parliamentarians, and ruling political party principles.

Keywords: modern slavery legislation, transparency, mandatory human rights due diligence, Canada

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Introduction

In the wake of tragedies such as the 2013 collapse of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh, where over 1,100 garment factory workers died, countries predominantly in the Global North began adopting transparency and corporate sustainability due diligence laws. These laws aim to increase corporate accountability for various human rights, environmental, and modern slavery offences in global supply chains

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(GSCs).¹ There are three models of these laws: 1) disclosure or transparency legislation, which is considered the softest or least stringent model; 2) Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence (MHRDD) legislation; and 3) MHRDD with civil liability legislation, which is considered the most stringent.² The factors that influence the enactment of a particular legislative model differ from country to country, although researchers have observed some commonalities. This article explores the influences behind Canada's passage of transparency legislation, the *Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act* (known as Bill S-211 but referred to herein as FAFCLSCA), passed on 3 May 2023.³

Canada has historically been a laggard in enacting and enforcing laws against powerful corporations, passing legislation only in response to external pressures rather than proactively.⁴ Adoption of a transparency law can be viewed as a continuation of Canada's reluctance to challenge business interests, particularly in resource-based industries—mining, oil, and natural gas—that underpin its role in the global economy.⁵ While there was international pressure on Canada to enact supply chain legislation—due to the proliferation of laws such as the United Kingdom (UK) *Modern Slavery Act 2015* (MSA), the French *Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law* (2017), and the Australian *MSA 2018*—I argue that distinctive aspects of Canada's domestic political economy operated as filters through which the international pressures passed and determined the enactment of transparency legislation.

¹ 'Modern slavery' is an umbrella term covering a range of practices including forced labour, which the International Labour Organization defines as 'all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty, for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily'. International Labour Organization, *Forced Labour Convention*, 1930 (No. 29), Article 2(1).

² G LeBaron and A Rühmkorf, 'The Domestic Politics of Corporate Accountability Legislation: Struggles over the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act', *Socio-Economic Review*, vol. 17, issue 3, 2019, pp. 709–743, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwx047>.

³ Bill S-211, *An Act to Enact the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act and to Amend the Customs Tariff*, 1st Session, 44th Parliament, 2023 (assented to 11 May 2023).

⁴ See H Glasbeek, 'Missing the targets – Bill C-45: Reforming the Status Quo to Maintain the Status Quo', *Policy and Practice in Health and Safety*, vol. 11, issue 2, 2013, pp. 9–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14774003.2013.11667787>, for Canada's reactive enactment of the Westray Law; and L Snider, *About Canada: Corporate Crime*, Fernwood Publishing, Winnipeg, 2015, which discusses Canada's reluctance to meaningfully regulate corporations.

⁵ W K Carroll (ed.), *Regime of Obstruction: How Corporate Power Blocks Energy Democracy*, AU Press, Athabasca University, Edmonton, 2021.

The article begins with an outline of the key features of each of the three legislative models, before evaluating the common factors influencing the type of legislation adopted in the UK, France, and Germany. Following this, I discuss the factors influencing the implementation of transparency legislation in Canada, including its membership of the Anglosphere (English-speaking countries with shared political and economic traditions), its powerful mining industry, the advocacy of civil society organisations (CSOs), key parliamentarians, and ruling political party principles. The article concludes by summarising how Canada's domestic political economy shaped its transparency law and whether Canada will enact MHRDD legislation in the future.

Transparency and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Laws

Transparency and corporate sustainability due diligence laws require multinational corporations (MNCs) to disclose their efforts to address forced labour and other abuses in their GSCs. These laws are a mix of public and private regulation with extraterritorial effect.⁶ Essentially, governments leverage the power of private corporate actors and other stakeholders to achieve the regulatory goal of changing corporate practices with regard to forced labour in GSCs.⁷ The three categories of these laws—Disclosure or Transparency; MHRDD; and MHRDD with civil liability—differ in scope (the types of harm covered and the size of the entities required to comply), reporting requirements, definition of supply chain, remedies, and oversight agencies.⁸ However, the following stylised typology and analysis of the laws will focus primarily on whether remedy is available to those harmed by the failure of companies to exercise due diligence.

Disclosure or Transparency Legislation

Disclosure or transparency laws do not oblige businesses to do more than report. Companies are required to report on their efforts, *if any*, to eradicate modern slavery in their GSCs, but not to take steps to prevent or eliminate such practices.⁹ This approach aligns with reflexive and responsive governance that emphasises voluntary disclosure and self-corrective measures over

⁶ R Mares, 'Corporate Transparency Laws: A Hollow Victory?', *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, vol. 36, issue 3, 2018, pp. 189–213, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0924051918786623>.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ LeBaron and Rühmkorf, p. 719.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 728. Canada's FAFCLSCA is an exception as it also covers child labour.

enforcement.¹⁰ Transparency laws typically have a narrow focus on specific issues such as forced labour or human trafficking.¹¹ They seek to mobilise investors and consumers to exercise their buying power which would support ‘clean’ companies and punish bad ones.¹² Less stringent transparency laws impose no direct penalties for failure to report while more stringent ones impose fines for non-compliance with reporting requirements.

Transparency legislation is the preferred model of Anglo-American countries as evidenced by the *California Transparency in Supply Chains Act* of 2010 (the California Act), the UK *MSA 2015*, and the Australian *MSA 2018*. The transparency model has been criticised for overestimating the leverage of consumers and investors to modify corporate conduct.¹³ Informational asymmetry is created due to company disclosures being biased towards reporting positive aspects of business operations and withholding from the public what can be classed as sensitive commercial information.¹⁴ Furthermore, independent verification of reports is not required in some disclosure regimes, raising questions about the veracity of disclosures.¹⁵ Disclosure regimes are also criticised for facilitating ‘cosmetic compliance’ because the design of transparency laws makes it possible for companies to take a tick-box approach to reporting by ‘incorporating key words and generic language without providing substantive or meaningful information’.¹⁶ Examples of box-ticking criteria include clauses prohibiting the use of forced labour in supplier contracts and conducting supplier factory audits.

¹⁰ S Wen, ‘The Cogs and Wheels of Reflexive Law – Business Disclosure under the Modern Slavery Act’, *Journal of Law and Society*, vol. 43, issue 3, 2016, pp. 327–359, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2016.00758.x>; I Ayres and J Braithwaite, *Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992.

¹¹ LeBaron and Rühmkorf.

¹² A G Barna, ‘The Early Eight and the Future of Consumer Legal Activism to Fight Modern-Day Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains’, *William & Mary Law Review*, vol. 59, issue 4, 2018, pp. 1449–1490, p. 1465.

¹³ Mares, p. 202.

¹⁴ B Pinnington, A Benstead, and J Meehan, ‘Transparency in Supply Chains (TISC): Assessing and Improving the Quality of Modern Slavery Statements’, *Journal of Business Ethics*, vol. 182, issue 3, 2023, pp. 619–636, p. 622, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-022-05037-w>.

¹⁵ Mares, p. 196.

¹⁶ I Landau, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence and the Risk of Cosmetic Compliance’, *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, vol. 20, issue 1, 2019, pp. 1–27; Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, *FTSE 100 At the Starting Line: An Analysis of Company Statements Under the UK Modern Slavery Act*, BHRRC, 2016, pp. 1–15, p. 13.

Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation

In contrast to transparency laws, MHRDD legislation typically covers a wider range of human rights and environmental abuses. The idea of what constitutes HRDD, which has been incorporated into MHRDD laws, is derived from the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Guiding Principle (GP) 17 describes the HRDD process as one where businesses ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their adverse human rights impacts’.¹⁷ It articulates four steps that should be conducted in the process, including ‘assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting upon the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed’. GP 22 additionally states that businesses should remediate harms if they have caused adverse impacts.¹⁸ MHRDD laws therefore oblige businesses to conduct a set of interrelated processes aimed at collaborating with and protecting rightsholders.¹⁹

MHRDD legislation improves upon transparency laws and has been the dominant model adopted across Europe. Examples include the Norwegian *Transparency Act* of 2021, Switzerland’s Criminal Code reforms and *Ordinance on Due Diligence and Reporting Obligations* of 2022, and the German *Act on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations in Supply Chains (Supply Chain Act)* of 2021.²⁰ MHRDD laws make due diligence processes, reporting, and remediation of harm mandatory. However, these laws range in stringency, with most imposing a duty on companies to consult with stakeholders, develop a due diligence plan, and implement grievance mechanisms at the company level.²¹ Few, however, provide a cause of action to rightsholders.

¹⁷ United Nations, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework*, 2011, HR/PUB/11/04, p. 17.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁹ See J Bonnitcha and R McCorquodale, ‘The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 28, issue 3, 2017, pp. 899–919, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chx042>; and J G Ruggie and J F Sherman III, ‘The Concept of “Due Diligence” in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: A Reply to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale’, *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 28, issue 3, 2017, pp. 921–928, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chx047>, for an in-depth evaluation of due diligence and its effectiveness in increasing corporate accountability.

²⁰ The German government announced on 9 April 2025 the repeal of the *Supply Chain Act* and adoption of the European Union Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. See M Ebdon, ‘German Coalition Plans to Repeal Supply Chain Due Diligence Act’, *Due Diligence Design*, 24 April 2025, retrieved 10 June 2025, <https://duediligence.design/german-coalition-plans-to-repeal-supply-chain-due-diligence-act>.

²¹ J Fudge, T Fanou, and J Humphrey, *Addressing Labour Exploitation Through Global Supply Chains: Moving Beyond Window Dressing to Effective Regulation*, 2022, GFLC Submission to Employment and Social Development Canada Regarding extended consultation on Labour Exploitation in Supply Chains.

The design of MHRDD laws and the way companies conduct HRDD in practice perpetuates cosmetic compliance and exacerbates the power imbalance between companies and rightsholders. Although the HRDD process is meant to be ongoing collaboration with rightsholders, too often ‘rightsholders at risk are only expected to be consulted as passive participants, rather than being active agents’.²² Since the consultation process is designed by the company or their consulting agency, this can create a power imbalance regarding information and resources such that affected workers and communities may be unable to effectively participate.²³

Another problem with MHRDD is the overreliance by companies on social audits.²⁴ HRDD is meant to be a continuous process that extends beyond social audits in the workplace.²⁵ However, information obtained from audits is often unreliable as suppliers engage in practices such as coaching workers prior to planned inspections. Additionally, audits are usually short, superficial checklist exercises that rarely investigate lower tiers of GSCs where workers are more vulnerable to abuses.²⁶ Genuine engagement with workers, trade unions, and civil society organisations (CSOs) is more likely to expose hidden violations.²⁷ The MHRDD process is also faulted for its lack of emphasis on remediation, which is not directly included in the four-step process outlined in GP 17 of the UNGPs.²⁸

²² S Deva, ‘Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Laws in Europe: A Mirage for Rightsholders?’, *Leiden Journal of International Law*, vol. 36, issue 2, 2023, pp. 389–414, p. 399, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0922156522000802>.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

²⁴ J Ford and J Nolan, ‘Regulating Transparency on Human Rights and Modern Slavery in Corporate Supply Chains: The Discrepancy between Human Rights Due Diligence and the Social Audit’, *Australian Journal of Human Rights*, vol. 26, issue 1, 2020, pp. 27–45, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1323238X.2020.1761633>.

²⁵ R McCorquodale and J Nolan, ‘The Effectiveness of Human Rights Due Diligence for Preventing Business Human Rights Abuses’, *Netherlands International Law Review*, vol. 68, issue 3, pp. 455–478, p. 457, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-021-00201-x>.

²⁶ O Outhwaite and O Martin-Ortega, ‘Worker-driven Monitoring – Redefining Supply Chain Monitoring to Improve Labour Rights in Global Supply Chains’, *Competition & Change*, vol. 23, issue 4, 2019, pp. 378–396, p. 382, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1024529419865690>.

²⁷ Ford and Nolan, p. 35.

²⁸ Deva; In Germany, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) financially sanctions companies non-compliant with the *Supply Chain Act*.

Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation with Civil Liability

MHRDD legislation with civil liability moves a step beyond the second model by imposing liability for negligence on companies that have been found to contribute to human or environmental rights abuses. These laws establish a duty of care, that is, ‘a legal obligation to adhere to a standard of reasonable care’ when carrying out acts that could foreseeably result in harm to human rights or the environment.²⁹ Victims harmed as a result may in turn bring civil (tort) action to claim remedy.

The French *Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law* of 2017 imposes civil liability when a company fails to act with due diligence. Companies subject to the law must, in line with the UNGPs, implement and report annually on a vigilance plan. This plan involves risk mapping, which entails identifying, analysing, and ranking supply chain risks; regularly assessing subcontractors and suppliers’ actions regarding human rights violations; developing reporting mechanisms in conjunction with trade unions; and monitoring the efficiency of the mechanisms and measures put in place.³⁰ The law provides victims and private parties a right of action against companies that fail to comply. This model is also used in the European Union Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, passed in May 2024.³¹ MHRDD with civil liability is therefore presently the most robust legislative model.

In such civil liability regimes, however, the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove the causal link between the company’s breach and the damage suffered. The more remote the damage is along the supply chain, the more difficult it is to prove the causal connection. Moreover, ‘material, social, institutional and linguistic circumstances’ may inhibit victims from taking legal action before French courts.³² For this reason, French non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Sherpa advocate for the burden of proof to be placed on MNCs, as was envisioned in the initial proposal of the French law.³³ **Table 1** provides summarised examples of transparency and MHRDD laws.

²⁹ S Cossart, J Chaplier, and T Beau De Lomenie, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’, *Business and Human Rights Journal*, vol. 2, issue 2, 2017, pp. 317–323, pp. 318–319, <https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2017.14>.

³⁰ Barna.

³¹ Under pressure from business, the European Commission is watering down this law. See Center for Sustainability and Excellence, ‘EU Delays Key Sustainability Directives’, CSE, 1 May 2025, <https://cse-net.org/eu-delays-key-sustainability-directives>.

³² E Savourey and S Brabant, ‘The French Law on the Duty of Vigilance: Theoretical and Practical Challenges Since its Adoption’, *Business and Human Rights Journal*, vol. 6, issue 1, 2021, pp. 141–152, p. 152, <https://doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2020.30>.

³³ Cossart, Chaplier, and Beau De Lomenie.

Although MHRDD laws require more information from companies and sometimes provide for remedy to rightsholders, all three models have been criticised as ineffective in increasing corporate accountability for supply chain abuses. This observation highlights a broader question about the function of regulation in capitalist societies: whether laws serve to meaningfully constrain powerful actors or to symbolically reaffirm state commitment to human rights while leaving corporate autonomy intact.³⁴ Canada’s choice of transparency over MHRDD legislation matters because it demonstrates an ongoing reliance on voluntary corporate action. The next section explores key aspects of a country’s domestic political economy that influence the enactment of a particular legislative model.

Table 1: Examples of Transparency and Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence Legislation

Title	Transparency			Mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence	
	UK <i>Modern Slavery Act 2015</i> , Section 54	Australian <i>Modern Slavery Act 2018</i>	Canadian <i>FAFCLSCA of 2023</i>	French <i>Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law of 2017</i>	German <i>Supply Chain Act of 2021</i>
Coverage	Slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labour, and human trafficking	Modern slavery, including trafficking in persons and child labour	Forced and child labour	Human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the environment	Human rights and environmental standards
Scope	Commercial organisations with a turnover of GBP 36 million operating in the UK	Entities with a consolidated revenue of AUD 100 million carrying out business in Australia	Government institutions, and entities conducting business in Canada meeting two of three criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have at least CAD 20 million in assets; • generate CAD 40 million in revenue; • have an average of 250 employees 	French companies with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more than 5,000 employees, including subsidiaries in French territories; • more than 10,000 employees, including global subsidiaries 	Enterprises with 3,000 employees in Germany (1,000 employees from 1 January 2024)
Duty of Due Diligence	None	None	None	Companies must implement a vigilance plan to identify risks and prevent serious attacks on human rights and the environment.	Enterprises must exercise due regard for the human rights and environmental due diligence obligations set out in the Act.

³⁴ Glasbeck.

<p>Due Diligence Procedures</p>				<p>The vigilance plan includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a map identifying, analysing, and ranking potential risks; • procedures to periodically assess compliance on the part of the company's subsidiaries, subcontractors, and suppliers; • actions to mitigate risks or prevent serious harm; • an alert mechanism to identify existing or potential risks in consultation with representatives of relevant trade unions; • a system to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of measures implemented 	<p>Due diligence obligations include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • establishing a risk management system; • designating a responsible person; • performing regular risk analyses; • issuing a policy statement; • laying down preventative measures in the business and with direct suppliers; • taking remedial action; • establishing a complaints procedure; • implementing the obligations with regard to risks from indirect suppliers; • documenting and reporting
<p>Duty to Report</p>	<p>A slavery and human trafficking statement must be prepared for each financial year and published on the organisation's website</p>	<p>Entities must give the Minister (Attorney-General's Department) a modern slavery statement for each financial year</p>	<p>Institutions and entities must report annually to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness about any steps taken to prevent or reduce the risk of forced or child labour being used in goods imported into or produced in Canada</p>	<p>The vigilance plan and report on its implementation must be made public in the company's annual report each financial year</p>	<p>An enterprise must prepare and publish on its website an annual report on the fulfilment of its due diligence obligations each financial year</p>

<p>Content of Report</p>	<p>The statement may include information about an organisation's:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • structure, business, and supply chains; • slavery and human trafficking policies; • due diligence processes regarding slavery in its supply chains; • parts of supply chains where there is a risk of slavery, and steps taken to assess and manage that risk; • effectiveness in ensuring that slavery is not occurring in its supply chains, measured against performance indicators; • training about slavery available to staff 	<p>A modern slavery statement must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • identify the entity; • describe its structure, operations, and supply chains; • describe the risks of modern slavery practices in its supply chains and entities it owns or controls; • describe actions, if any, taken to assess and address those risks, including due diligence and remediation; • describe how the effectiveness of such actions is assessed; • describe the consultation process with entities it owns or controls; • include any other relevant information 	<p>The report must include information about the institution or entity's:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • structure, activities, and supply chain; • policies and due diligence processes regarding forced and child labour; • business and supply chains that carry risk of forced and child labour, and steps taken to assess and manage that risk; • measures taken to remediate forced or child labour; • measures taken to remediate vulnerable families for loss of income resulting from measures taken to eliminate forced or child labour; • training for employees about forced or child labour; • method of assessing its effectiveness in ensuring no use of forced or child labour 	<p>What has been done to implement the vigilance plan as outlined under <i>Due Diligence Procedures</i></p>	<p>The report must state:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • whether any human rights or environmental risks, or violation of human rights or environmental obligations have been identified; • what has been done to fulfil due diligence obligations; • how the impact and effectiveness of the measures have been assessed; • what conclusions have been drawn from the assessment for future measures
<p>Liability for Failure to Comply</p>	<p>The Secretary of State may bring civil proceedings for an injunction against non-compliant organisations</p>	<p>The Minister may publish an entity's failure to comply with the reporting requirements on the modern slavery register</p>	<p>Failure to comply is punishable on summary conviction and a fine of not more than CAD 250,000</p>	<p>Civil liability proceedings in a French court, whereby non-compliant companies can be ordered to compensate any loss which could have been prevented by compliance with the Law</p>	<p>The Federal Office of Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) can fine enterprises up to EUR 800,000 (or 2% of turnover if annual turnover is more than EUR 400 million) and exclude them from public contracts for up to 3 years if fines are at least EUR 175,000</p>

Factors which Influence the Enactment of Legislation

Studies of the factors leading to the enactment of supply chain laws in different countries are scarce, as this is an emerging field. While many articles discuss the legal features of supply chain laws in different jurisdictions, a comprehensive literature review of English-language political science, regulation, and legal articles published before January 2024 identified only three articles that discussed the factors that shaped the legislation in the UK, France, and Germany.³⁵ Despite the existence of common international pressures (such as target 8.7 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, which aims to eliminate forced labour and the worst forms of child labour), these articles identified domestic political and economic factors that shaped the model of legislation adopted in each country.

Persistence of Civil Society Organisations

A common theme across the literature is the instrumental part civil society played in the enactment of legislation. In the UK, the Transparency in Supply Chains (TISC) activist coalition was key in providing legitimacy to a transparency law.³⁶ TISC comprised religious bodies, including the Church of England, and prominent NGOs such as Amnesty International, Anti-Slavery International, Unseen, and the Walk Free Foundation. While many of the NGOs that eventually endorsed transparency legislation continued to advocate for a stronger law, they compromised with business associations and accepted transparency legislation as a ‘first step’ in the process.³⁷ The Rana Plaza building collapse also helped organisations such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) to demonstrate the need for legislation to address worker exploitation.³⁸

In France, the *Duty of Vigilance Law* was developed in 2011 by ‘a small, peripheral group of young, female activists, ... lawyers and left-wing deputies’, seeking to build on the UNGPs.³⁹ They formed a working group to address the liability of

³⁵ LeBaron and Rühmkorf; A Evans, ‘Overcoming the Global Despondency Trap: Strengthening Corporate Accountability in Supply Chains’, *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 27, issue 3, 2020, pp. 658–685, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1679220>; D Wehrauch, S Carodenuto, and S Leipold, ‘From Voluntary to Mandatory Corporate Accountability: The Politics of the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act’, *Regulation & Governance*, vol. 17, issue 4, 2023, pp. 909–926, <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12501>.

³⁶ LeBaron and Rühmkorf.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 730.

³⁸ C Berman, ‘Shaping the Modern Slavery Act: A Look Back’, *OpenDemocracy*, 25 September 2016, retrieved 4 April 2022, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-trafficking-and-slavery/shaping-modern-slavery-act-look-back>.

³⁹ Evans, p. 662; Cossart, Chaplier, and Beau De Lomenie, p. 317.

parent companies and lobbied for four years during which the bill was continuously disregarded by government and opposed by business. What strengthened the campaign was the involvement of human rights and environmental NGOs (such as Amnesty International), legal justice advocates, Catholic socialists, and trade unions. The involvement of unions such as the French Democratic Confederation of Labour added legitimacy to the campaign in the eyes of the Socialist Party with which they were historically allied.⁴⁰

In Germany, NGOs formed the Corporate Accountability (CorA) Network in 2006, which advocated for MHRDD legislation.⁴¹ The opportunity to push for it came after the 2013 elections when, as part of a coalition agreement, social democrats negotiated a National Action Plan (NAP) where the government would develop a law if less than 50% of German companies failed to properly conduct due diligence as part of a monitoring and benchmarking exercise.⁴² CorA introduced the Initiative Lieferkettengesetz [Supply Chains Act], which was a broad alliance of CSOs, business associations, unions, and faith-based organisations whose strategy was to invoke Christian values to sway the centre-right parties.⁴³ This coalition combined an emotional human rights storyline (including the Rana Plaza tragedy) with scientific evidence, after the results of the monitoring exercise showed that only 13–17% of companies properly executed due diligence.⁴⁴

Business Opposition or Support

The role of business or industry associations in influencing the type of law adopted is also a common theme. In the UK, industry actors derailed efforts to introduce stronger legislation by supporting transparency legislation. Businesses including Amazon and IKEA formed a ‘transparency coalition’ to deflect possible legislation which imposed criminal sanctions.⁴⁵ Both the government and businesses leaned into the narrative of transparency legislation as a ‘first step’—language later adopted by Canadian parliamentarians who tabled the FAFCLSCA—towards stronger legislation. They also formed a coalition with prominent NGOs (TIISC) in a further attempt to thwart more stringent regulation.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Evans, pp. 671–672.

⁴¹ Weihrauch, Carodenuto, and Leipold, p. 913.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 915.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 916.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 918.

⁴⁵ LeBaron and Rühmkorf, p. 730.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 733.

Business opposition against legislation in France came mainly from the Movement of the Enterprises of France and the French Association of Large Companies.⁴⁷ They argued that the legislation would penalise French companies and jeopardise jobs and investment because competitors such as the rest of Europe, the United States of America (USA), and China would not be subject to the same liabilities. They also took issue with the law having vague wording, unclear liabilities, and overly severe financial penalties.⁴⁸ Although amendments were made to the law, the essence of MHRDD with civil liability remained intact.⁴⁹

German companies were generally not in favour of supply chain legislation either. However, civil society recruited companies that had expressed support for an MHRDD law, or already had due diligence measures in place, to speak publicly in support of the law.⁵⁰ These included smaller, fair trade companies, but also larger companies like Primark and Nestlé Germany. The support of the German car industry was critical, which happened after the tragic collapse of the Brazilian Brumadinho dam in 2019 in which over 250 people died.⁵¹ German inspection company TÜV SÜD had certified the dam as safe despite knowing it was not. Following this tragedy both BMW and Daimler publicly expressed support for an MHRDD law, and Volkswagen followed in 2020.⁵²

Domestic Institutional Environment: Political and Economic Regulatory Tradition

Despite pressure from international norms and institutions, a country's political and economic traditions are key factors that influence the form and stringency of legislation. State–market relations are often indicative of the type of legislation likely to be adopted.⁵³ This is exemplified by the variations in supply chain legislation in countries with a liberal model like the UK, a state-centric model like France, and a mixed model like Germany. The liberal model or market capitalist systems are characterised by competitive markets where autonomous business actors are allowed to set the parameters for corporate governance.⁵⁴ The UK *MSA* reflects this regulatory tradition by relying on existing private governance and not

⁴⁷ Evans, p. 662.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Cossart, Chaplier, and Beau De Lomenie.

⁵⁰ Wehrauch, Carodenuto, and Leipold, p. 916.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 917.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ M Mason, L Partzsch, and T Kramarz, 'The Devil is in the Detail—The Need for a Decolonizing Turn and Better Environmental Accountability in Global Supply Chain Regulations: A comment', *Regulation & Governance*, vol. 17, issue 4, 2023, pp. 970–979, p. 973, <https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12539>.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

establishing any new or stringent enforcement mechanisms.⁵⁵ In contrast to the UK, France has had a long-standing acceptance of state intervention for problem solving. This state-centric institutional tradition coupled with anti-globalisation sentiments and mistrust of MNCs offshoring jobs to the Global South (thereby undermining French labour standards) were important factors that allowed for the passage of MHRDD legislation with civil liability.⁵⁶ The French mainstream media made direct correlations between Rana Plaza, MNCs, globalisation, and a lack of adequate legislation addressing foreign corporate accountability.⁵⁷ Intense business lobbying succeeded in watering down the original bill, which initially included a new liability regime and reversal of the burden of proof, but such setbacks did not change the essence of the law.⁵⁸

Germany is categorised as having a mixed model or managed capitalism, reflected in the negotiations between the state and business associations with regard to the development of policy.⁵⁹ Consequently, the German MHRDD law is based on administrative monitoring and enforcement by the state, namely the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA). It is a combination of soft measures, including support for companies in meeting the requirements of the law, and hard measures, including sanctions for non-compliance with due diligence obligations.

Governing Political Party Principles and Key Parliamentarians

Ruling political party principles also determines the type of legislation a country enacts. The UK *MSA* was hastily passed before the 2015 general elections.⁶⁰ In 2010, the Conservative government promised to reduce immigration and introduced the *Immigration Act 2014* which limited undocumented migrants' access to public services.⁶¹ However, the Conservatives knew that such harsh treatment of migrants would alienate Anglican and Catholic churchgoers who are a core part of their electorate. They therefore used the *MSA* to project the image of providing assistance to 'modern slaves' who were trafficked to the UK for the purpose of

⁵⁵ LeBaron and Rühmkorf.

⁵⁶ Evans, p. 667; Mason, Partzsch, and Kramarz, p. 973.

⁵⁷ Evans.

⁵⁸ Cossart, Chaplier, and Beau De Lomenie.

⁵⁹ Mason, Partzsch, and Kramarz, p. 974.

⁶⁰ C Robinson, 'Policy and Practice: Claiming Space for Labour Rights within the United Kingdom Modern Slavery Crusade', *Anti-Trafficking Review*, issue 5, 2015, pp. 129–143, <https://doi.org/10.14197/atr.20121558>.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

labour exploitation.⁶² The *MSA* was as much a diversion from the government's anti-immigration agenda as a commitment to ending modern slavery.⁶³ British Prime Minister Theresa May was a key architect of the *MSA* during her time as Home Secretary.⁶⁴ Section 54, which deals with transparency in supply chains, was inserted fairly late into the parliamentary process, after NGOs pushed for its inclusion.⁶⁵ Although the section is weak, the Conservative government believed that naming and shaming was an effective tactic to get companies to comply and take effective action.

In France, the Socialist Party led by President François Hollande was in power from 2012 to 2017.⁶⁶ In response to activists seeking support for a supply chain law, Hollande and over 70 National Assembly deputies pledged that 'the principles of the responsibility of the parent companies for the actions of their overseas subsidiaries [will] be translated into law'.⁶⁷ Activists therefore viewed the Socialists as sympathetic to the cause and frequently emphasised the five-year window of opportunity to get a law passed under this administration. The law was not a priority for Hollande's then Minister of Economy Emmanuel Macron. However, in August 2016 Macron vacated his ministerial post to focus on his presidential campaign and was replaced by Michel Sapin, 'who became a key advocate, putting the bill back onto the legislative agenda'.⁶⁸

Like the Socialists in France, Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) was also instrumental in the enactment of the MHRDD law. From 2013 to 2021, the German government was a coalition of centre-right parties Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) with the centre-left SPD.⁶⁹ While the CDU and CSU were reluctant to support MHRDD legislation, the SPD supported it and included it in the coalition agreement following the 2017 elections. Gerd Müller, CSU politician and Minister of Development and Cooperation, announced his support for an MHRDD law in 2018. Although his

⁶² *Ibid.*; J Fudge, 'Why Labour Lawyers Should Care About the Modern Slavery Act 2015', *King's Law Journal*, vol. 29, issue 3, 2018, pp. 377–406, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09615768.2018.1549699>.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Robinson.

⁶⁵ G Craig, 'The UK's Modern Slavery Legislation: An Early Assessment of Progress', *Social Inclusion*, vol. 5, issue 2, 2017, pp. 16–27, p. 22, <https://doi.org/10.17645/si.v5i2.833>.

⁶⁶ Evans, p. 670.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 672.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 675.

⁶⁹ Weihrach, Carodenuto, and Leipold, p. 910.

political affiliation was right wing, he acted against the majority of his party due to his Christian beliefs and dismay over Rana Plaza.⁷⁰

Factors Which Influenced the Passage of Transparency Legislation in Canada

The domestic political and economic factors that determined the model of supply chain legislation enacted in the UK, France, and Germany also influenced the type of legislation enacted in Canada. This section explains how Canada's domestic political economy, including its affiliation with the Anglosphere and its powerful mining industry, resulted in the federal government's adoption of the transparency model. It is based on 23 semi-structured interviews with Canadian parliamentarians, government officials, business representatives, international organisations, and CSOs that participated in the legislative process. Ethical approval was obtained, and the full list of the interviewees is available in my thesis.⁷¹ I also reviewed parliamentary debates, reports, and submissions concerning the enactment of supply chain legislation in Canada.

Canada's Cultural and Economic Links to the Anglosphere

Canada's close ties with other Anglosphere or English-speaking countries (namely the UK, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand) helps to explain why it enacted a transparency law. Countries in the Anglosphere have colonial heritage of formerly belonging to the British Empire and economic traditions such as liberal, market economies or market capitalist systems.⁷² As leading proponents of neoliberal ideology since the 1970s, the UK and USA greatly facilitated the growth of complex transnational supply chains.⁷³ The culture and economic ideology of the Anglosphere therefore explains why light-touch transparency legislation has been enacted by most Anglo countries, including Canada. During 2019 Canadian government consultations on enacting modern slavery legislation, conducted by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC), Canadian companies wanted modern slavery reports they had already produced for other jurisdictions

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 917–918.

⁷¹ J L Humphrey, 'Experimental Regulation to Address Modern Slavery and Forced Labour in Global Supply Chains: Canada's Passage of Transparency Modern Slavery Legislation', Doctoral Thesis, McMaster University, Hamilton, 2024, <https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/handle/11375/31092>.

⁷² J Bennett, 'America and the West: The Emerging Anglosphere', *Orbis*, vol. 46, issue 1, 2002, pp. 111–126, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387\(01\)00109-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0030-4387(01)00109-0).

⁷³ D Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.

to also suffice for Canada.⁷⁴ An industry representative explicitly stated that its members ‘would be more comfortable with transparency reporting measures similar to the UK and Australian Modern Slavery Acts’.⁷⁵

Canada’s Powerful Mining Industry

Canadian extractive companies contribute significantly to the country’s economy. An estimated 75% of the world’s mining and exploration companies are headquartered in Canada.⁷⁶ In 2020, mining accounted for ‘692,000 jobs, contributed \$107 billion or 5% to Canada’s GDP’, and minerals exploration accounted for ‘\$102 billion or 21%’ of exports.⁷⁷ Canada’s extractive sector is also dominant globally. In 2019, ‘publicly traded Canadian-based mining and exploration companies were present in 96 foreign countries, and two-thirds of their total \$263.2 billion assets were located abroad’.⁷⁸ Canadian mining companies and their subsidiaries have been linked to human rights and environmental violations abroad.⁷⁹ Despite this, successive Conservative and Liberal federal governments continue to finance the industry as it is key to Canada maintaining its position within global markets.⁸⁰

The Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) and the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) are prominent bodies representing the extractive sector. They are powerful lobbyists that have fought for years against more stringent efforts to regulate the activities of MNCs abroad. These associations have exerted influence on both the Conservative and Liberal parties. For instance, Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) John McKay tabled Bill C-300, the *Corporate Accountability of Mining, Oil and Gas Corporations in Developing Countries Act*, in the

⁷⁴ Employment and Social Development Canada, *Labour Exploitation in Global Supply Chains: What We Heard Report*, ESDC 2022, p. 9.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ A Neve, ‘Strengthened Human Rights Accountability in Extractive Sector in Everyone’s Interest’, *The Hill Times*, 11 October 2010, <https://www.hilltimes.com/2010/10/11/strengthened-human-rights-accountability-in-extractive-sector-in-everyones-interest/275406>.

⁷⁷ C Dowling, ‘Mining Companies Face an Evolving Array of Climate Change Risk and Opportunities’, *Canadian Mining Journal*, 24 January 2022, para 2, <https://www.canadianminingjournal.com/featured-article/mining-companies-face-an-evolving-array-of-climate-change-risk-and-opportunities>.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ K Ciupa and A Zalik, ‘Enhancing Corporate Standing, Shifting Blame: An Examination of Canada’s Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act’, *The Extractive Industries and Society*, vol. 7, issue 3, 2020, pp. 826–834, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2020.07.018>.

⁸⁰ Carroll.

House of Commons in 2009. The bill proposed sanctions for Canadian extractive companies violating human rights abroad, including withdrawal of government funding. MAC and PDAC lobbied extensively against Bill C-300, which failed to pass due to lack of support from the Conservative and Liberal parties.⁸¹

The mining industry was similarly influential with regard to the passage of the FAFCLSCA. MAC, the Retail Council of Canada, and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce indicated that they were willing to accept a transparency law similar to the UK and Australian Acts, which greatly influenced the support of the Liberal and Conservative parties for transparency legislation.⁸² Just as businesses in the UK supported transparency legislation to avoid stronger legislation, industry in Canada did the same to prevent the passage of an MHRDD law.

Advocacy of Civil Society Organisations

After the Rana Plaza tragedy, a class action lawsuit was filed by victims of the incident against Canadian retailer Loblaw Companies Limited and its affiliates, including Joe Fresh Apparel, which sourced clothing from the factories.⁸³ Canadian CSOs seized on this momentum to push for supply chain legislation. In 2016, World Vision Canada, inspired by the UK *MSA*, began advocating for similar legislation in Canada. World Vision referred to the reputational damage suffered by Canadian companies after Rana Plaza to illustrate the benefits of a law requiring companies to monitor and report on their GSCs.⁸⁴ The charity urged the parliamentary Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development to conduct a study on child labour and modern slavery. At the hearings for this 2017 study, World Vision advocated for transparency legislation as a ‘first step’, echoing the rhetoric in the UK. In conjunction with Canadian law firm Dentons, it suggested the *Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act* (ESTMA) of 2014 as a precedent.⁸⁵

⁸¹ R Janda, ‘Note: An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries (Bill C-300): Anatomy of a Failed Initiative’, *McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy*, vol. 6, issue 2, 2010, pp. 97–107.

⁸² Submissions to the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights regarding Bill S-211, <https://sencanada.ca/en/committees/ridr/briefs/44-1/#?sessionFilter=44-1&OrderOfReferenceID=568185>.

⁸³ *Das v George Weston Limited*, 2018 ONCA 1053.

⁸⁴ World Vision Canada, *Check The Chain: Preventing Child Labour – The Case for Canadian Supply Chain Transparency Legislation*, World Vision Canada Policy Discussion Paper, 2015.

⁸⁵ House of Commons Canada, *A Call To Action: Ending The Use Of All Forms Of Child Labour in Supply Chains*, 15 October 2018, p. 39, retrieved 8 April 2022, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/FAAE/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=10262351>.

ESTMA requires extractive companies to report annually on payments made to governments in Canada and abroad, and the FAFCLSCA closely mirrors its reporting entity thresholds and sanctions.⁸⁶

At the 2017 parliamentary hearings, CSOs such as Amnesty International, the Canadian Labour Congress, and Human Rights Watch advocated for MHRDD legislation.⁸⁷ World Vision's views, however, were more closely aligned with prominent UK organisations invited to participate in the study by the parliamentary subcommittee. These organisations included ETI and Unseen UK, as well as the Australian Walk Free Foundation, which supported transparency legislation as a 'first step', further demonstrating the influence of the Anglosphere in Canada.⁸⁸

In contrast to World Vision, the Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability (CNCA) opposed transparency legislation. The CNCA was formed in 2005 and comprises CSOs such as MiningWatch and Above Ground (formerly the Halifax Initiative), which were founded in the 1990s to promote foreign corporate accountability for Canadian mining companies.⁸⁹ Since its formation, the CNCA's campaign for a regulatory framework that would hold corporations responsible for human rights abuses created crucial, ongoing domestic pressure for legislation to be enacted in Canada. Similar to Germany's CorA, the CNCA advocates for MHRDD legislation. The network provided model MHRDD legislation to New Democratic Party (NDP) MP Peter Julian to assist with the drafting of Bill C-262, which he tabled in the House of Commons on 29 March 2022. Bill C-262, the *Corporate Responsibility to Protect Human Rights Act*, sought to mandate Canadian MNCs to implement due diligence processes and allow foreign victims of corporate human rights abuses recourse in Canadian courts.⁹⁰ However, it never received a second reading.

Key Parliamentarians

Liberal MP John McKay (who previously tabled Bill C-300) tabled the first iteration of FAFCLSCA (Bill C-423 the *Modern Slavery Act*) on 13 December 2018. He was inspired by World Vision's advocacy, the UK *MSA*, his Christian

⁸⁶ Ciupa and Zalik.

⁸⁷ Witness testimonies and briefs submitted to Canada's 2017 parliamentary study, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/SDIR/StudyActivity?studyActivityId=9618040>.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Ciupa and Zalik.

⁹⁰ P Julian (sponsor), *Bill C-262: An Act Respecting the Corporate Responsibility to Prevent, Address and Remedy Adverse Impacts on Human Rights Occurring in Relation to Business Activities Conducted Abroad*, House of Commons Canada, 44th Parliament, 1st session, First reading, 29 March 2022.

faith, and British MP William Wilberforce’s ‘battle to abolish slavery in the British Empire’.⁹¹ Mirroring the UK precedent, McKay believed that transparency legislation, unlike a more robust MHRDD law, was a good ‘first step’, as it would gain the support needed in parliament and from business, particularly the mining industry.⁹² After Bill C-423 failed to get a second reading in the House of Commons, McKay partnered with Independent Senator Julie Miville-Dechéne to reintroduce Bill C-423 as Bill S-211 in the Senate on 5 February 2020.⁹³ Miville-Dechéne’s interest in eradicating modern slavery stemmed from her appointment as head of the Council on the Status of Women in Québec, where she dealt with, among other subjects, human trafficking.⁹⁴ McKay and Miville-Dechéne utilised the Canadian All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) to End Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, which comprised majority Liberals and Conservatives, to build cross-party support for Bill S-211.⁹⁵ The Canadian APPG is modelled after the UK Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery APPG, further demonstrating the UK influence.⁹⁶

Bill S-211 initially failed to progress as parliament was focused on the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Senator Miville-Dechéne continued to advocate for the legislation. She highlighted media scandals such as the forced labour conditions in the Malaysian Top Glove factory which supplied personal protective equipment (PPE) to Canadian hospitals.⁹⁷ Additionally, products such as cotton made using Uyghur Muslim forced labour in the Xinjiang region of China entering Canada via supply chains also demonstrated the need for legislation.⁹⁸ Miville-Dechéne reintroduced Bill S-211 into the Senate on 24 November 2021, and with support from the Liberals and Conservatives, it was passed on 3 May 2023.⁹⁹ MP McKay’s partnership with Senator Miville-Dechéne was crucial to Canada’s adoption of transparency legislation.

⁹¹ Interview, John McKay, 18 January 2022.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ It is easier to get private member bills through the Senate due to the absence of the lottery system present in the House of Commons. (Interview, John McKay).

⁹⁴ Interview, Julie Miville-Dechéne, 14 October 2021.

⁹⁵ Interview, John McKay.

⁹⁶ History of Canada’s APPG to End Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, <https://endmodernslavery.ca/about>.

⁹⁷ E Szeto, C Taylor, and A Tomlinson, ‘Hidden Camera Reveals “Appalling” Conditions in Overseas PPE Factory Supplying Canadian Hospitals, Expert Says’, *CBC News*, 15 January 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/marketplace-overseas-personal-protective-equipment-manufacturing-working-conditions-1.5873213>.

⁹⁸ Interview, Julie Miville-Dechéne.

⁹⁹ House of Commons Canada, Vote No. 310, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, 3 May 2023, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Members/en/votes/44/1/310>.

Ruling Political Party Principles

Following the 20 September 2021 federal election, the Liberal Party of Canada secured a minority government. Thus, the Liberals needed the support of another party to pass legislation. Since both the Liberals and Conservatives support limited regulation of business, they voted to pass the FAFCLSCA, with the support of the mining industry and other business associations that preferred transparency legislation. Both parties agreed that Bill S-211 was a good ‘first step’, echoing similar rhetoric articulated by UK businesses, World Vision, McKay, and Miville-Dechêne. Conservative MP Garnett Genuis stated that although Bill S-211 would not ‘solve every problem’, they should pass the bill and strengthen it later.¹⁰⁰ By contrast, two other prominent political parties, the NDP and Bloc Québécois, supported Bill C-262 which was the MHRDD legislation tabled by NDP MP Peter Julian in conjunction with the CNCA. However, Bill C-262 gained no industry support and no traction in parliament. Ruling party principles was therefore a key factor which influenced the passage of transparency legislation in Canada.

Conclusion

In this article, I explored the factors which influenced the passage of transparency and MHRDD laws in different countries, and specifically the passage of transparency legislation in Canada. I argued that international pressures to enact legislation were filtered through distinctive aspects of each country’s domestic political economy, which ultimately determined the type of legislation enacted. Advocacy by civil society, business support or opposition, domestic regulatory tradition, the support of key parliamentarians, and ruling political party principles led the UK, France, Germany, and Canada to adopt a specific legislative model. The possibility that Canadian companies operating in Europe may have to report under MHRDD laws did not influence Canada’s choice of legislative model.

Several countries in Europe, and now the European Union, have enacted MHRDD laws. By contrast, Anglo-American jurisdictions prefer light-touch transparency laws. Anglo countries’ preference for transparency legislation is in large part due to their commitment to the freedom of businesses to set the parameters for corporate governance. Canada’s powerful mining industry, which has a history of successfully lobbying against increased foreign corporate accountability legislation, exemplifies this commitment. Moreover, Canada’s membership in the Anglosphere, and its close ties to the UK, greatly influenced its choice of a transparency law.

¹⁰⁰ House of Commons, *Debates (Hansard) No. 074*, 18 May 2022, section 1835, retrieved 20 July 2022, <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/house/sitting-74/hansard#11699320>.

The characterisation of transparency legislation as a ‘first step’, which originated in the UK, was embraced by World Vision Canada, MP McKay, and Senator Miville-Dechéne. While this characterisation was successful, the trade-off was that MNCs are not required to conduct MHRDD processes, nor does this legislation provide a right of action in Canadian courts for foreign victims of rights violations in the supply chains of Canadian MNCs. Canada’s adoption of a transparency law that imposes no enforceable obligations other than to report reaffirms its reputation as a laggard when it comes to regulating corporate power. As the CNCA continues to campaign for an MHRDD law, it is crucial to note that no other country in the Anglosphere has moved beyond transparency to enact MHRDD legislation, despite widespread acknowledgement of the weaknesses of current transparency laws.¹⁰¹ Ten years have passed since the UK enacted the *MSA* as a ‘first step’, yet a second step has still not been taken. So far, transparency laws have not been a ‘first step’ but rather a dead end, and there is a risk that the FAFCLSCA will also serve as a dead end for Canada.

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¹⁰¹ M Koekkoek, A Marx, and J Wouters, ‘Monitoring Forced Labour and Slavery in Global Supply Chains: The Case of the California Act on Transparency in Supply Chains’, *Global Policy*, vol. 8, issue 4, 2017, pp. 522–529, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12512>; Business & Human Rights Resource Centre and Modern Slavery Registry, *Modern Slavery Act: Five Years Of Reporting, Conclusions From Monitoring Corporate Disclosure*, BHRRC, 2021; A Sinclair and F Dinshaw, *Paper Promises? Evaluating the Early Impact of Australia’s Modern Slavery Act*, Human Rights Law Centre, 2022, retrieved 1 November 2025, <https://www.hrlc.org.au/reports/2022-2-3-paper-promises-evaluating-the-early-impact-of-australias-modern-slavery-act>.